Titles link to accepted versions for download
F1000Research 2021, 10:1164
Harassment on the Internet, particularly on social media such as Twitter, has reached a level where it can, without exaggeration, be characterised as a real-world societal problem in Japan. However, studies on this phenomenon in the Japanese language environment, especially adopting a victim-centric perspective, are rare. In this paper, we incorporated the concept of online harassment and reviewed existing studies about online harassment from Japan and abroad. We then conducted a detailed case analysis of the “flaming” of a female journalist and those who targeted her on Twitter. Based on our analysis, we observed that there were three layers of users who targeted the journalist: influencers, users who responded to the instigation by influencers, and trolls. Each harassed the journalist, but in a different manner. Given Japan’s particular difficulty of imposing domestic regulations on social media companies that are mostly from abroad, we propose and describe possible measures that individuals and their employers should consider taking.
2 November, 2020, Tokyo Review
More research into Girls Channel would be needed to understand if and how its users represent Japan’s “silent majority” – not least of all understanding whether users are truly made by “girls” in their 20s-30s as the company claims. But it strongly suggests that many Japanese women are driven politically by more than economic and gender issues. It might be easy to dismiss Girls Channel as frivolous or not representative of the mainstream, but this would shut ourselves off from a valuable source for understanding grassroots opinion and opinion-shapers.
15 March 2019, NORTIA Network Conference EU-Japan, Tokyo Japan
Does foreign investment pose a threat? If so, what are those threats? Based on an analytical framework developed from existing literature of economics, international political economy and international relations, this paper analyses EU’s perception on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and its newly established investment screening scheme. The paper shows industrial growth is translated as political power and scientific knowledge, thereby national prestige that determines the country’s national prestige as well as its international positions. Control of this ‘resource’ by a foreign company is regarded as controlling of a host nation’s political power & international prestige, therefore a threat in a symbolic sense. The case analysis of EU showed EU lacks sufficient research on technology leak or inflow from a foreign country, as well as implications of the third country’s government owning and controlling the investing company.
CAN FOREIGN INVESTMENT POSE THREATS? EU'S PERCEPTION AND INVESTMENT SCREENING SCHEME
防衛学研究 Defense Studies Vol.60, pp.21-41, 2019
Japan has practised economic diplomacy with tools such as development assistance to achieve its economic security and to promote the developmental state model abroad. The process of making foreign policy contextualised and reinforced the norms, for both Japan’s domestic and international audiences. Japan today tries to promote science and technology as a main catalyst for creating industries and supporting its domestic, export-oriented economy. This is based on Japan’s own interpretation of its historical path and economic success and is also used to justify its engagement in the Arctic, a region where Japan does not have any sovereign territories.
How does a state that is not a ‘natural’ Arctic or Antarctic state perceive the polar regions, interpret their roles in its foreign policy and translate this into actual polar policy? This paper seeks to answer these questions by comparing the Arctic and Antarctic policies of Japan. Japan, as a defeated power and a late-comer to the international system established after World War II, takes a liberal position in the governance of Antarctica. Having and maintaining a capability to conduct scientific research in the Antarctic via international decision-making institutions has been considered an important status marker associated with great power identity. Japan attempts to replicate the general success of its Antarctic policy towards the Arctic, backed by tools of science and technological diplomacy, the purpose of which is to revive its domestic economy. Japan's scientific whaling in the Antarctic is primarily a domestic, identity-based political conflict between a nostalgia for Japan's imperial past and its more modern, liberal identity of today.
Palgrave Macmillan: London, 2016
This book examines the growing interest by Asian states, which are normally considered as ‘outsiders’ in the Arctic governance system. Whilst existing research asserts that Asian states are mostly interested in the economic aspect of the changing Arctic, including its mineral and fossil sources and the opening up of new sea routes, the book argues that the relation between Asian states and the Arctic is much more complex and dynamic, grounded in their unique perspective on national security and the role of economic development in securing their national interests.
THE ARCTIC POLICY OF CHINA AND JAPAN: MULTI-LAYERED ECONOMIC AND STRATEGIC MOTIVATIONS
This paper attempts to present and compare the various components of the Arctic policies of China and Japan. The analysis shows the Chinese and Japanese governments are in the gradual process of consolidating their Arctic policies, but both China and Japan see the Arctic less as a strategically crucial point from the traditional security perspective, but more from the viewpoint of economic security and development. In addition, their perspectives manifest themselves slightly differently from one another. China is willing to invest more in the Arctic. Japan is willing to build on the achievements it has made so far, maintaining its low-profile position as a non-Arctic or non-coastal state, while at the same time emphasising Japan’s past contribution to Arctic research.
TRAJECTORIES OF JAPANESE AND SOUTH KOREAN ENVIRONMENTAL AID: A COMPARATIVE HISTORICAL ANALYSIS
Environmental aid has become a major component of development aid. We analyzed the contingent characters of environmental aid of Japan and South Korea using the definition of Williams, which regards aid policy as donor driven and autobiographical of the donor agencies and societies from which they sprang.
in Lassi Heininen (Ed.), Arctic Yearbook 2012, Northern Research Forum: Akureyri, Iceland, pp.93-103, 2012 (with Stewart Watters).
Japan has a long history in polar research and this is acknowledged and encouraged by the Japanese government. However, the Japanese government has not created a unified, cross-ministerial task force operating within a unified strategy. This stems from the particular characteristics of Japanese government administration, where ministerial horizontal cooperation is rare, and where business and industry interests often play a critical role. The overarching ambition of Japan's Arctic policy is to plant seeds in order to secure interests in the future.
in Lassi Heininen (Ed.), Arctic Yearbook 2012, Northern Research Forum: Akureyri, Iceland, pp.103-113, 2012 (with Stewart Watters).
The paper analyses the extent to which Singapore has an Arctic policy and what factors may be driving that policy. We find that Singapore has considerable economic and political interest in the development of international maritime policy, including the Arctic, and is concerned by the potential local impacts of the climate change already visible in the Arctic. As a developmental state, there are close links between Singapore's state institutions and major commercial enterprises. Singapore's competence in the management of complex port infrastructure and the fostering of global leaders in the offshore marine and engineering industry are of particular note in analyzing factors driving the Singapore government's interest in the Arctic's potential.
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN THAILAND: LESSONS FROM IMPLEMENTING LOCAL AGENDA 21 IN THREE CITIES
This article examines the effect of development assistance programs on Local Agenda 21 (LA21) programs in three municipalities of Thailand.